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Internal Control Opinion Shopping and Audit Market Competition 
 
 
Abstract 
 
This study examines whether audit clients engage in internal control opinion shopping activities 
and whether audit market competition appears to facilitate those activities. Regulators have long 
been concerned about the impact of both audit market competition and opinion shopping on audit 
quality. We adopt the framework developed in Lennox (2000) to construct a proxy to measure 
the tendency that clients engage in internal control opinion shopping activities. Our empirical 
results suggest that clients are successful in shopping for clean internal control opinions. In 
addition, we find evidence that internal control opinion shopping occurs primarily in competitive 
audit markets. Finally, our results indicate that among auditor dismissal clients, opinion shopping 
is more likely to occur when dismissals are made relatively late during a reporting period and 
when audit market competition is high. Our findings have implications for the current policy 
debate regarding audit quality and audit market competition.  
 
Key words: opinion shopping; internal control weakness; audit opinion; audit quality; audit 
market competition  
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Internal Control Opinion Shopping and Audit Market Competition 
 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Opinion shopping has long been of concern to regulators (U.S. Senate 1976; SEC 1988; 
PCAOB 2011b). The Treadway Commission Report notes that differences of opinion between 
client management and auditors may prompt management to consult with another auditor “to 
obtain an opinion that coincides with management’s interest in presenting the results in the most 
favorable light” (Mintz 1995). While prior research has provided evidence that clients are 
successful in shopping for clean audit opinions in markets outside the U.S., there is limited 
evidence that clients in the U.S. engage in audit opinion shopping.1 Our purpose in this paper is 
to broaden the traditional opinion shopping setting to include opinions related to the 
effectiveness of internal control over financial reporting (hereafter, internal control opinions). In 
so doing, we provide an alternative laboratory within which issues related to audit quality and 
potential compromises in auditor independence may be evaluated. 
Our motivation for investigating whether companies appear to shop for favorable internal 
control opinions comes from two sources. First, Defond and Zhang (2014) suggest that the topic 
of opinion shopping is important but note that research in this area has not been particularly 
productive. Specifically, Defond and Zhang (2014) state that the primary limitations of opinion 
shopping research are that the results do not seem to be generalizable to the U.S., and that the 
evidence that does exist is based exclusively on the use of audit opinions as a proxy for audit 
quality. The authors suggest that the importance of opinion shopping is not attributable to the 
mechanism itself (i.e., the audit opinion) but because the mechanism is one of many factors that 
may be associated with compromised auditor independence. By investigating a mechanism that 
                                                            
1 Lennox (2002) and Carcello and Neal (2003) provide evidence consistent with audit opinion shopping in the U.S. 
during pre-SOX years. We discuss potential differences between pre-SOX and post-SOX opinion shopping in 
Section V. 
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is very similar to financial statement audit opinions but that is associated with a much higher 
incidence of unfavorable outcomes for audit clients, we seek to shed light on potential audit 
quality and independence concerns that are related to the audit reporting process. 
Our second reason for investigating internal control opinion shopping is based on 
numerous reports mentioning surprisingly low numbers of reported material weaknesses. For 
example, a recent Wall Street Journal article notes that Audit Analytics reported 629 material 
weaknesses in the first year after the Sarbanes-Oxley Act (SOX) was adopted but only 141 such 
weaknesses in 2011 (Chasan 2013). There is little doubt that genuine improvement in SEC 
registrants’ internal controls has occurred since the passage of SOX. However, Chasan (2013) 
cites a concern that the infrequency of reported material weaknesses may be related to a potential 
“lack of rigor around material weakness testing” as observed by the Office of the Chief 
Accountant, the SEC’s Division of Corporation Finance, and the PCAOB. The PCAOB’s Staff 
Audit Practice Alert No. 11 (October 24, 2013) states that in 15 percent of the audit engagements 
occurring during a recent three-year reporting period, inspections staff found that the audit firm 
“had failed to obtain sufficient appropriate evidence to support its opinion on the effectiveness of 
internal control due to one or more auditing deficiencies identified by the inspections staff” 
(PCAOB 2013b). Furthermore, the Deputy Chief Accountant recently commented, “in some 
instances companies – managers and auditors – are not adequately evaluating the severity of 
[internal control] deficiencies. That may mean that some of the deficiencies are being classified 
as significant deficiencies, when they are really material weaknesses and investors aren’t getting 
the disclosures that are intended” (Mont 2015). To the extent that questionable audit rigor and/or 
potentially misclassified internal control deficiencies at least partially reflect acquiescence to 
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client preferences, the existence of internal control opinion shopping would be consistent with 
these regulatory findings and concerns.  
Based on the above, our first research question asks whether internal control opinion 
shopping appears to occur in U.S. markets – that is, whether adverse internal control opinions 
would have been issued more frequently if audit clients had made different decisions regarding 
their incumbent auditors. Ettredge, Heintz, Li, and Scholz (2011) find that clients with adverse 
internal control opinions are more likely than clients with clean opinions to dismiss their auditors 
and to choose higher quality replacements. They interpret these findings as suggesting that the 
auditor dismissal decisions made by clients with adverse internal control opinions reflect, on 
average, a desire to improve or signal the improvement of their financial reporting quality. 
Although Ettredge et al. (2011) is somewhat related to our study and we generally concur with 
their findings, it is important to note that our purpose is to determine whether a client’s decision 
regarding the future of its incumbent auditor is related to the relative likelihood, ex ante, of 
receiving a clean versus adverse internal control opinion. More specifically, we present a 
probabilistic analysis of both auditor retention and auditor dismissal decisions that allows us to 
test more directly whether audit clients appear to engage in internal control opinion shopping. 
The second research question we investigate relates to how competition among auditors 
affects clients’ internal control opinion shopping activities. At issue is whether audit market 
competition strengthens or compromises auditor independence. Policy makers and regulators 
worry that consolidation in the audit market has caused audit quality to decrease (e.g., U.S. 
Chamber of Commerce 2006, Rappeport 2008). The maintained assumption among these parties 
seems to be that competition among auditors is desirable. However, when the PCAOB issued a 
2011 concept release on mandatory auditor rotation, some commenters expressed concern that 
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the heightened audit market competition attributable to mandatory auditor rotation could 
motivate opinion shopping activities, thereby decreasing audit quality (PCAOB 2011a). 
Although the PCAOB dropped their auditor rotation proposal in 2013, the debate over audit 
market competition has continued. We hope to inform this debate by providing insights on how 
opinion-shopping activities might be influenced by audit market competition. 
Our third research question explores whether the timing of auditor dismissals seems to be 
related to opinion shopping. Although internal control deficiencies may be found throughout the 
year, auditors typically do not make a final judgment on their internal control opinions until 
relatively late in the reporting period. Given that a client is most likely to engage in opinion 
shopping when it is able to reliably predict what the incumbent auditor’s opinion is going to be, 
the timing of a dismissal may be indicative of whether it is more likely to have been motivated 
by opinion shopping. Our analysis in this area complements previous research related to the 
timing of auditor dismissals and audit opinion shopping and also speaks to the possibility that 
additional scrutiny may need to be applied to auditor changes that occur close to clients’ fiscal 
year-ends (e.g., Schwartz and Soo 1996).  
To address our first research question, we adopt the “what if” framework of Teoh (1992) 
and Lennox (2000) and investigate the relationship between internal control opinion shopping 
and auditor dismissal and retention decisions. More specifically, we use an adverse internal 
control opinion model to estimate the probability (P1) of a client receiving an adverse internal 
control opinion if the client dismisses its auditor and the probability (P0) of the same client 
receiving an adverse internal control opinion if the client does not dismiss its auditor. A client is 
said to be engaging in opinion shopping if P1 is less than P0 and the client dismisses its auditor 
or if P1 is greater than P0 and the client retains its auditor. Using U.S. data from 2005-2011, we 
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provide evidence suggesting that clients successfully engage in internal control opinion 
shopping. When we include a comparably constructed measure of going concern (GC) opinion 
shopping in the same model, our internal control opinion shopping measure remains significant 
while the GC opinion shopping measure is not significant. Our conclusion is that adverse internal 
control opinions convey more information (and/or less predictable information) than GC 
opinions about important financial reporting problems; hence, firms have a greater incentive to 
attempt to manage the internal control reporting process than to manage the going concern 
reporting process. 
For our second research question, we use competition measures employed by Numan and 
Willekens (2012) and others to test the relationship between audit market competition and 
internal control opinion shopping. Our proxies are based on the Herfindahl Index and two spatial 
competition measures that assess the market share distance between the incumbent auditor and 
its closest competitor within a Metropolitan Statistical Area (MSA). Numan and Willekens 
(2012) argue that the spatial competition measures are suitable proxies for auditor competition 
because the audit market is oligopolistic in nature. Our results indicate that while internal control 
opinion shopping does appear to exist on average, it tends to be most pervasive when audit 
market competition is relatively high. The finding that audit market competition may facilitate 
successful opinion shopping is consistent with recent studies (e.g., Newton, Wang and Wilkins 
2013) suggesting that increased competition in U.S. audit markets may actually impact audit 
quality negatively. 
To test our third research question, we define “late dismissals” as observations where 
clients dismiss auditors in the third quarter or later and “early dismissals” as observations where 
clients dismiss auditors in the second quarter or earlier. Based on these categories, we find that 
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opinion shopping among clients that dismiss their auditors is more likely when auditors are 
dismissed late in the reporting period. We also find that in highly competitive audit markets, late 
dismissals occur relatively more frequently than early dismissals and also are much more likely 
to be associated with opinion shopping.  
Our study is important for a number of reasons. First, despite long-standing concerns 
about the dangers of opinion shopping and what seems to be a widely held belief that such 
activities do take place, our study is the first to document the existence of opinion shopping in 
any form in the post-SOX era. Second, our finding that internal control opinion shopping appears 
to exist while audit opinion shopping does not suggests that audit clients view internal control 
reports as being more important than audit reports. As such, regulators may wish to increase their 
monitoring of internal control issues, particularly since concerns have already been expressed by 
the PCAOB that audit firms may not be collecting enough evidence to support their internal 
control opinions. Third, our finding that internal control opinion shopping is more likely in 
competitive audit markets informs the continuing debate regarding the pros and cons of 
increased auditor competition. More specifically, our results suggest that attempts to increase 
competition between audit firms may impact audit quality negatively. 
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. In Section II we describe the 
auditor’s responsibilities in audits of internal control over financial reporting. In Section III we 
present background information related to opinion shopping and also develop our three research 
questions. In Section IV we discuss our research design and sample characteristics. Section V 
presents our primary empirical results and additional tests, and in Section VI we provide 
concluding remarks. 
  
Page 7
II. AUDITS OF INTERNAL CONTROL OVER FINANCIAL REPORTING 
Section 404 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act requires both management and the external 
auditors to report on the operating effectiveness of internal control over financial reporting 
(ICFR). While auditors have been responsible for assessing internal control for over two decades 
(AICPA 1988), early evaluations were required primarily for planning and risk assessment 
purposes. Prior to SOX, auditors could choose not to rely on a poorly designed or functioning 
internal control by increasing the level of substantive testing performed in order to obtain 
sufficient evidence to support the audit opinion. The passage of SOX elevated both the 
complexity involved in obtaining an adequate understanding and proper evaluation of internal 
control as well as the transparency of the subsequent findings.  
 The objective in an audit of ICFR is to express an opinion on the operating effectiveness 
of the controls. Therefore, the focus of the audit is on evaluating the severity of control 
deficiencies discovered in order to determine whether any are serious enough to potentially 
undermine effective ICFR. A material weakness is defined by the PCAOB as a deficiency in 
ICFR such that there is a reasonable possibility that a material misstatement of the annual or 
interim financial statements will not be prevented or detected on a timely basis (PCAOB 2007). 
Therefore, if one or more material weaknesses exist that have not been remediated as of year-
end, the company's ICFR cannot be considered effective and an adverse internal control opinion 
must be issued. Significant deficiencies in internal control may also be identified over the course 
of an audit. A significant deficiency is less severe than a material weakness, and therefore does 
not require the auditors to issue an adverse opinion on ICFR. However, it does warrant 
disclosure to both management and the audit committee (PCAOB 2007).  
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 Prior research suggests that the tasks involved in judging the severity of internal control 
deficiencies are “unstructured, complex, and difficult” (Bedard and Graham 2011).2 Absent 
objective evidence that a control deficiency warrants classification as a material weakness (such 
as an associated material misstatement in the current period) substantial judgment is required in 
order to determine whether a deficiency represents a significant deficiency, or is in fact a 
material weakness. Auditors are charged with evaluating both the likelihood and magnitude of an 
internal control deficiency in order to determine its appropriate classification. The PCAOB refers 
auditors to the guidance provided by the FASB related to accounting for contingencies (FASB 
1975) to determine the likelihood that the deficiency discovered presents more than a remote 
chance (indicating it is either reasonably possible or probable) that a material misstatement will 
not be prevented or detected on a timely basis. In evaluating materiality, the PCAOB points to 
the Supreme Court’s judgment that a fact is material if there is “a substantial likelihood that the 
…fact would have been viewed by the reasonable investor as having significantly altered the 
‘total mix’ of information made available” (PCAOB 2010).  
 The subjective and complex nature of the severity classification process could potentially 
aid an audit client in its quest for a clean internal control opinion. Legitimate differences of 
opinion may exist among auditors as to the appropriate classification of an internal control 
deficiency. As such, clients may be able to exploit the ambiguity of the severity classification 
criteria to shop for a favorable internal control opinion, especially in highly competitive audit 
environments. These notions form the basis for our research questions and empirical tests.  
                                                            
2 Bedard and Graham (2011) note the ambiguity in the wording choices used to define the categories of internal 
control deficiencies. A significant deficiency does not require an adverse internal control opinion, yet the guidance 
provided by the Supreme Court specifically uses the word “significantly” in its language to explain what they 
consider to be material. In addition, the difficulty involved in interpreting probability phrases such as “more than 
remote” and applying them in practice has been noted in prior research (e.g., Amer, Hackenbrack, and Nelson 1994, 
Asare and Wright 2012).  
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III. BACKGROUND AND RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
Background 
 Regulators and investors have long been concerned about the relationship between 
auditor changes and audit quality. A 1976 Senate report includes an interview with Abe Briloff, a 
prominent accounting professor and frequent Barron’s contributor, in which he suggested that 
differences of opinion related to proper accounting treatments “might produce some kind of 
shopping around for accountants” (U.S. Senate 1976). In the late 1980s, remarks by then-SEC 
Chairman David Ruder indicated that new amendments to the S-K, 8-K, and 14-A disclosure 
requirements were aimed at improving transparency for companies that were changing auditors 
“in potential opinion shopping situations” (Ruder 1988).3 Some of these changes were in 
response to the Treadway Commission, which expressed concern that when companies consult 
with additional auditors, “commercial pressures are introduced into the process of resolving the 
financial reporting issue” (Mintz 1995). 
 Much of the attention paid to opinion shopping during the post-SOX era has taken place 
within the context of PCAOB discussions related to mandatory audit firm rotation. In Release 
No. 2011-006, the Board notes that some parties are worried that mandatory audit firm rotation 
would encourage opinion shopping and that competition for new engagements could lead auditor 
suitors to offer favorable accounting or auditing outcomes. In the same release, the former CEO 
of Deloitte is quoted as stating that a rotation requirement “would allow companies to disguise 
opinion shopping by enabling them to portray a voluntary change in auditors as obligatory” 
(PCAOB 2011b). Although extensive corporate and political resistance has caused the PCAOB 
                                                            
3 It is also interesting to note that the paragraph immediately preceding Chairman Ruder’s comment on opinion 
shopping mentions the possibility of an SEC rule requiring management to assess internal controls related to 
financial reporting – a full 14 years before formal certifications were required by SOX. 
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to drop its auditor rotation project, the Board remains focused on issues related to auditor 
independence (Chasan 2014). Opinion shopping is one such issue. 
 Despite clear indications from regulators that opinion shopping may exist and may have 
unfavorable outcomes for financial statement users, corroborative research evidence is very 
limited. As discussed by Defond and Zhang (2014), initial forays in this area (e.g., Chow and 
Rice 1982; Smith 1986; Krishnan 1994) found that clients that changed auditors after receiving a 
GC opinion were not significantly more likely to receive a clean opinion from their new auditor. 
To our knowledge, the only study using a similar method that has documented evidence in 
support of audit opinion shopping is Carcello and Neal (2003). As a part of their supplemental 
analysis, Carcello and Neal (2003) find that going concern clients with a higher percentage of 
affiliated directors serving on the audit committee are more likely to receive clean audit opinions 
in the year following auditor dismissals. Although this finding using pre-SOX data is consistent 
with opinion shopping, most of the evidence from studies that limit their analysis to clients with 
auditor dismissals suggests either that audit opinion shopping does not work (or does not exist) 
or that there are other explanations for why clients with GC opinions change auditors. 
 A critical problem with many opinion shopping studies is their implicit assumption that 
while a decision to change auditors might be associated with opinion shopping, a decision not to 
change auditors could not be associated with opinion shopping. Teoh (1992) addressed this 
oversight by developing a “what-if” scenario in which clients evaluate the probability of 
receiving good and bad outcomes across current and potential future auditors. In this framework, 
opinion shopping exists if a client’s decision to replace or retain its current auditor is driven by 
assessments of probabilities related to audit opinion outcomes. Lennox (2000) was the first paper 
to employ this approach in an empirical setting and document “successful” opinion shopping. He 
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develops a prediction model for a sample of U.K. audit clients and shows that clients would have 
received unfavorable audit opinions more frequently if they had not made the auditor retention / 
switching decisions that they did, in fact, make. Lennox (2002) extends this analysis to U.S. 
firms and documents behavior consistent with audit opinion shopping between 1996 and 1998.  
Our own investigation of audit opinion shopping corroborates the findings of Lennox (2002) in 
the pre-SOX period; however, we find no such evidence in the post-SOX period. We defer 
further discussion of this issue to Section V. 
 Our decision to modify the traditional opinion shopping setting and focus on internal 
control opinions is based on a number of factors. First, regulators appear to care more about 
internal control problems than going concern problems. For example, PCAOB inspection reports 
frequently mention deficiencies related to internal control opinions and auditors’ testing of 
internal controls, but very rarely mention issues related to going concern assessments.4 Second, 
internal control problems are much more common than going concern problems. During our 
sample period, data from Audit Analytics show that roughly two percent of accelerated filers 
received GC opinions while six percent received adverse internal control opinions. Furthermore, 
although these numbers are meaningful, it is likely that they significantly understate the 
difference between the proportion of firms having internal control problems that require 
significant audit judgment (i.e., classifying a problem as a significant deficiency or a material 
weakness) and the number of firms having going concern problems that require significant audit 
judgment. Our final reason for focusing on internal control opinions relates to their information 
content. Going concern opinions tend to be preceded rather predictably by poor performance, 
                                                            
4 Additionally, in a 2014 survey from the International Forum of Independent Audit Regulators (IFIAR), 24 percent 
of audits reviewed for internal control testing had at least one deficiency while only 6 percent of audits reviewed for 
going concern issues had at least one deficiency. Additionally, the number of audits with going concern deficiencies 
decreased by 4 percent from 2012 to 2014 while the number of audits with internal control testing deficiencies 
increased by 52 percent from 2012 to 2014 (IFIAR 2015). 
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debt covenant violations, and debt service default; however, it would be difficult for an external 
user to identify internal control weaknesses from any source other than the internal control report 
itself. As such, firms with internal control problems may have a relatively strong incentive to 
attempt to manage the internal control reporting process such that these problems are not made 
public.  
Research Questions 
 Our empirical analysis is structured to address three research questions. The first question 
asks whether there is evidence to suggest that internal control opinion shopping exists. 
Regulators, practitioners, and academics agree that in certain situations, companies may have an 
incentive to shop for audit opinions. As Lennox (2000, p. 323) notes, when faced with 
potentially unfavorable circumstances, “any forward-looking company should care about how 
switching affects the subsequent audit opinion.” It stands to reason that companies should grant 
the same consideration to internal control opinions, particularly since material weakness 
disclosures tend to be viewed negatively by capital market participants (e.g., Hammersley, 
Myers, and Shakespeare 2008; Ashbaugh-Skaife, Collins, Kinney, and LaFond 2009; Dhaliwal, 
Hogan, Trezevant, and Wilkins 2011) and also may be used to establish management scienter in 
class action lawsuits and SEC sanctions related to restatements (e.g., Rice, Weber and Wu 2014; 
Hogan, Lambert and Schmidt 2014). 
Our investigation of internal control opinion shopping is also shaped by recent statements 
by regulators highlighting the confluence of (1) potential lack of rigor in audits of internal 
control over financial reporting and (2) significant decreases in the number of reported material 
weaknesses. Underlying these concerns, of course, is the specter of Type II internal control 
opinion errors – for our purposes, the granting of clean internal control opinions when adverse 
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opinions are warranted. Some such errors doubtless occur despite auditors’ best efforts (i.e., 
sufficient evidence is collected but “honest mistakes” are made in the application of judgment). 
Other errors may occur either when auditors collect sufficient evidence but acquiesce to client 
preferences – such as classifying a potential material weakness as a significant deficiency – or 
when auditors do not collect sufficient evidence. Although the latter condition has been the 
primary focus of both the SEC and the PCAOB (e.g., Chasan 2013, PCAOB 2013b), both of 
these conditions could be indicative of opinion shopping. Our purpose with the first research 
question is to investigate whether internal control opinion shopping seems to exist, thereby 
addressing one potential source of regulators’ concern. 
Our second research question asks whether internal control opinion shopping is 
influenced by audit market competition. Audit market competition is particularly relevant to 
opinion shopping because heightened audit market competition will increase the probability of 
auditor switching or the threat of auditor switching (Oxera Consulting Ltd 2006). Accordingly, 
audit market competition may lead to a higher probability of opinion shopping (PCAOB 2011b). 
The pros and cons of audit market competition have been discussed at great length during the 
post-SOX era. Although most of the arguments advanced by regulatory bodies have supported 
the idea of increased competition, the 2008 GAO report commissioned by Congress found no 
evidence that high audit market concentration (i.e., low auditor competition) results in decreased 
audit quality. Consistent with this notion, Newton et al. (2013) find that restatements are more 
likely in areas where auditor competition is high, presumably due to the fact that audit firms in 
such markets are forced to compete heavily on fees (Chaney, Jeter, and Shaw 2003; Numan and 
Willekens 2012). 
Page 14
Audit fees increased dramatically after the initial passage of SOX, but began decreasing 
during the global financial crisis and have yet to recover. Current PCAOB Chairman, James 
Doty, recently stated that audit fees have been flat for some time, that the audit market has 
stagnated, and that in such markets “the primary battleground for [audit] market share [becomes] 
price” (Doty 2014). In this environment, both existing and potential clients are likely to possess 
significant bargaining power. Given the judgment required in classifying internal control 
problems as significant deficiencies or material weaknesses and in assessing the extent to which 
existing weaknesses have been sufficiently remediated, auditors may be more likely to acquiesce 
to client preferences when clients have greater bargaining power. Stated differently, clients may 
be able to secure clean internal control opinions more readily in highly competitive markets. This 
notion forms the basis for our second research question. 
Our third research question asks whether the timing of an auditor dismissal provides an 
indication of whether the dismissal may have been motivated by opinion shopping. The timing of 
dismissals may be important because if clients choose to dismiss the incumbent auditor for 
reasons related to opinion shopping, they have to be reasonably certain that they would have 
received an adverse opinion from the incumbent auditor. In a typical audit, design deficiencies 
are noted in the second quarter and additional deficiencies may be identified in the third or fourth 
quarter as the operating effectiveness of the controls is tested. The decision regarding the internal 
control opinion itself normally is not made until relatively late in the fiscal year or even after 
year-end. Until the client is able to make a reliable estimation of what the opinion is going to be, 
it may attempt to remediate (or not) as well as attempt to convince the auditor that any issues that 
exist are significant deficiencies instead of material weaknesses. Ultimately, because the client’s 
uncertainty about the nature of the opinion is more likely to be resolved as the end of the 
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reporting period draws nearer, we expect that dismissals that occur relatively late in the year are 
more likely to be motivated by opinion shopping.5  
As a complement to our development above, we also note that the timing of auditor 
dismissals vis-à-vis audit opinions has been the subject of a fair amount of academic research 
(e.g., Schwartz and Menon 1985; Kluger and Shields 1991; Schwartz and Soo 1996). For 
example, research shows that (1) if management disagrees with the auditor’s opinion, the auditor 
is more likely to be dismissed; (2) auditor-client disagreements tend to occur late in the fiscal 
year after sufficient evidence has been obtained to make an informed judgment; and (3) if 
dismissal occurs because of a client’s reporting methods or the potential disclosure of 
deteriorating financial condition, the dismissal is more likely to occur at or near the client’s fiscal 
year-end after auditor-client negotiations prove unsuccessful. Furthermore, Schwartz and Soo 
(1996) state that their discussions with SEC officials support the contention that auditor changes 
occurring late in a registrant’s fiscal year are potentially the result of opinion shopping. Although 
the relationships investigated in these studies pertain to the standard auditor’s report, the findings 
are equally relevant to internal control opinions.  
IV. RESEARCH DESIGN AND SAMPLE 
Research Design 
Our empirical tests are based on the audit opinion shopping models of Lennox (2000). To 
test for the existence of internal control opinion shopping, we first estimate a probit model to 
generate predictions for the probability that a client will receive an adverse internal control 
opinion. We then incorporate the predictions from this model into a second model that 
                                                            
5 Similar behavior is observed in studies such as Jeter and Shivakumar (1999) and Das, Shroff and Zhang (2009) 
that document more earnings management near the end of reporting periods as firms attempt to reach year-end 
earnings targets. 
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investigates the relationship between internal control opinion shopping and auditor dismissal 
decisions.  
The general form of the first model is as follows: 
 
MWt = γ0 + γ1MWt-1+ γ2DISMISSt + γ3DISMISSt*MWt-1 + γ4Xt + γ5DISMISSt*Xt + ε      [1] 
 
 
where MWt is a binary variable identifying clients with clean [0] or adverse [1] internal control 
opinions in year t, MWt-1 is a binary [0,1] variable identifying clients with clean [0] or adverse 
[1] internal control opinions in year t-1, DISMISS is a binary variable identifying clients’ year t 
auditor retention [0] or dismissal [1] decisions, and X is a vector of year t control variables 
frequently used in studies investigating the determinants of material weaknesses in internal 
controls (e.g., Ashbaugh-Skaife, Collins, and Kinney 2007; Doyle, Ge, and McVay 2007). Our 
set of control variables includes the announcement of a restatement, firm size, firm age, firm 
complexity (as proxied by foreign sales and number of business segments), bankruptcy risk, 
revenue growth, Big 4 auditors, the presence of a net loss, restructuring activity, acquisitions, 
institutional ownership, and a binary variable identifying clients that had changes in CEO or 
CFO during the current or prior year.6 Details regarding all of these measures are presented in 
Appendix A. We also include controls for year and for the 12 Fama-French industry groups and 
we cluster standard errors by audit client. 
Following Lennox (2000), we estimate equation [1] across the entire sample with 
DISMISS=1 if the incumbent auditor was dismissed in year t and DISMISS=0 if the incumbent 
auditor was retained in year t. We then use the coefficients from this model to generate two 
predicted values of MW for each observation – one with DISMISS=1 and one with DISMISS=0. 
                                                            
6 While material weaknesses, at least theoretically, should precede restatements, research shows that the reverse 
often is true. For example, Scholz (2014) finds that between 2005 and 2012, only 22 percent of annual restatements 
were preceded by reports of material weaknesses. 
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The difference between these two predicted values is used to calculate our opinion-shopping 
variable (SHOP), which we use in the following auditor-dismissal model: 
 
DISMISSt = β0 + β1SHOPt + β2COMPt + β3Zt + ε                  [2] 
 
 
In equation [2], DISMISS is a binary variable identifying clients’ year t auditor retention 
[0] or dismissal [1] decisions, SHOP is our test variable, COMP represents alternative measures 
of audit market competition in year t, and Z is a vector of year t control variables commonly 
included in studies investigating auditor changes (e.g. Landsman, Nelson, and Rountree 2009; 
Ettredge et al. 2011). The controls represented by Z include the announcement of a restatement, 
firm size, leverage, profitability, bankruptcy risk, cash holdings, auditor tenure (as of the 
previous year), auditor-client size mismatch, the audit office’s share of fees in the MSA industry, 
prior year GC opinion, revenue growth, accruals, the ratio of inventory and receivables to total 
assets, the existence of a net loss, acquisition activity, institutional ownership, and a binary 
variable identifying clients that had changes in CEO or CFO during the current or prior year. 
Again, details regarding the calculation of these variables are presented in Appendix A. As in 
Model 1, we also include controls for year and industry groups and cluster standard errors by 
audit client. 
As in Lennox (2000), SHOP is a function of the predicted values that are generated from 
the first model, transformed into probabilities from the standard normal distribution.7 More 
specifically, SHOP is equal to the predicted probability (P1) of receiving an adverse internal 
control opinion when DISMISS = 1 minus the predicted probability (P0) of receiving an adverse 
internal control opinion when DISMISS = 0. In this framework, a client is said to be engaging in 
                                                            
7 Like Lennox (2000), we also use raw (not normalized) predicted values to define SHOP. We discuss these results 
later in the paper. 
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opinion shopping if P1 < P0 and the client dismisses its auditor (DISMISS=1) or if P1 > P0 and 
the client retains its auditor (DISMISS=0). Stated differently, as P1 – P0 becomes more negative 
(more positive), clients that are engaging in opinion shopping should be more likely (less likely) 
to dismiss their auditors. A negative value of β1 would suggest that opinion shopping exists. 
 We use three proxies for audit market competition (COMP). The first proxy, 
DISTANCE_MSA, defines competition as the absolute value of the difference between the 
incumbent audit office’s fee market share within its MSA and the fee market share of the audit 
office within that MSA that is closest to the incumbent auditor. The second proxy for 
competition, DISTANCE_IND, calculates the same difference based on fee market shares within 
an MSA industry.8 Numan and Willekens (2012) document a significant positive relation 
between both DISTANCE measures and incumbent auditors’ fees, suggesting that fee pressure is 
likely to be greatest when the closest competing audit office’s market share is very similar to that 
of the incumbent audit office (i.e., when DISTANCE_MSA or DISTANCE_IND is small). 
Because competition is decreasing in both DISTANCE measures, we decile-rank both variables 
based on decreasing values before including them in our empirical models. Our third competition 
measure, HERF, is based on the Herfindahl Index, which captures the variation in the number of 
audit firms present in a given market as well as the distribution of audit fees across those firms 
(see Appendix A for calculation details). Because the Herfindahl Index would be highest for a 
market with one audit firm and lowest for a market with numerous firms having similar market 
shares, we calculate HERF by ranking clients into deciles based on decreasing values of the 
Herfindahl Index. Thus, as with DISTANCE_MSA and DISTANCE_IND, higher values of HERF 
reflect greater audit market competition.  
                                                            
8 We define audit markets based on Fama & French 12 industry definitions within U.S. Metropolitan Statistical 
Areas (MSA).  
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We include our three competition measures in separate estimations of equation [2] to 
establish a baseline relationship between auditor dismissals (DISMISS) and audit market 
competition (COMP). Our expectation is that dismissals will be more likely in competitive 
markets; that is, we expect β2 to be positive. However, our second research question asks whether 
internal control opinion shopping – not auditor dismissal – is more prevalent in competitive audit 
markets. To address this question, we estimate separate models for below-versus-above median 
values of DISTANCE_MSA, DISTANCE_IND, and HERF. A value of β1 that is more negative 
when the model is estimated for above-median competition than when it is estimated for below-
median competition would suggest that internal control opinion shopping is more likely when 
audit market competition is greater. We also estimate models that include the decile-ranked 
competition measures as main effects and as interactions with our opinion shopping variable 
(SHOP). In these models, a negative coefficient for the interaction term would suggest that 
internal control opinion shopping is more prevalent in high competition markets. 
Our third research question asks whether the timing of auditor dismissals is indicative of 
internal control opinion shopping. More specifically, are auditor dismissals that occur relatively 
late in the year more likely to be associated with opinion shopping than auditor dismissals that 
occur relatively early in the year? To address this question, we define early dismissals as those 
that occur before the end of the second quarter and late dismissals as those that occur after the 
beginning of the third quarter. We then estimate the dismissal model (equation 2) separately for 
early and late dismissals with all non-dismissal firm years included as control observations. If 
late dismissals are more indicative of opinion shopping, the coefficient for SHOP should be more 
negative in the models that include late auditor dismissals than in the models that include early 
auditor dismissals.  
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Sample 
We obtain data for our sample from Compustat, Audit Analytics, and CRSP. Our focus is 
on shopping for auditors’ internal control opinions, which became available in 2004 after the 
implementation of SOX Section 404. Our sample begins the following year so that we can 
include lagged material weaknesses in our analysis. Our second research question involves 
competition among auditors, so we eliminate observations that occur in audit markets where 
there is limited competition. Specifically, we delete observations when there are fewer than three 
auditors in an MSA. Given that a majority of clients are audited by Big 4 auditors, we focus on 
the opinion shopping activities of Big 4 clients and exclude companies that were audited by non-
Big 4 auditors in year t-1. Finally, we delete observations where the auditor resigned because 
opinion shopping revolves around clients’ ability to dismiss their auditors rather than auditors 
choosing to leave.9 The final sample for our material weakness (MW) prediction model consists 
of 11,846 firm-years between 2005 and 2011. The sample for our auditor dismissal model drops 
to 11,361 firm-years due to the data requirements for additional control variables.  
Table 1 presents descriptive statistics for the variables that are used in our study. Panel A 
includes variables representing internal control weaknesses, auditor switching, opinion shopping, 
and competition. In our sample, 4.2 percent of the observations receive an adverse internal 
control opinion in year t. This percentage is significantly lower than those that receive an adverse 
internal control opinion in year t-1 (5.4 percent). Panel A also reveals that auditor switching (i.e., 
auditor dismissal) occurs in 2.8 percent of our sample, and that the average auditor in our sample 
differs in audit fee market share from the closest substitute auditor by 8 percent and 18.6 percent 
at the MSA and MSA-industry-levels, respectively. Panel B of Table 1 presents descriptive 
                                                            
9 We also conduct sensitivity tests that include both dismissals and resignations. The results of these tests are 
presented in Section V. 
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statistics on the control variables that are used in our regressions. The statistics in Panel B 
indicate that the sample firms are larger, more profitable, and less risky than Compustat averages 
(untabulated) for the same period. Less than one percent of sample firms receive a GC opinion, 
average auditor tenure is 7.627 years, and 98.9 percent of sample firms retain the services of a 
Big 4 auditor in year t (i.e., only 1.1 percent change to a non-Big 4 auditor). 
A Pearson correlation matrix of selected variables is presented in Table 2. The correlation 
matrix shows that auditor dismissals are more common when competition is high and when the 
client receives an adverse internal control opinion in the prior year. Other correlations indicate 
that auditor dismissals are positively correlated with client risk, poor client performance, and 
restatements, and that auditor dismissals are negatively correlated with institutional ownership. 
V. EMPIRICAL RESULTS 
Primary Tests 
 Table 3 presents our adverse internal control opinion prediction model. We estimate this 
model to generate the predicted values that are used to construct our opinion shopping variable 
(SHOP). Table 3 shows that material weaknesses are significantly more likely to be reported in 
the current period if they were reported in the previous period (MWt-1), suggesting that adverse 
internal control opinions tend to be sticky. We also find that material weaknesses are 
significantly more likely for restatement clients (REST), smaller clients (SIZE), more complex 
clients (ROOT_SEG), and clients that have higher acquisition cash flows (ACQUISITION), net 
losses (LOSS) and a higher bankruptcy risk (BANK_RISK).10 Material weaknesses are 
significantly more likely for clients that have had a recent change in top management and are 
                                                            
10 We also find (but do not present in Table 3) that material weaknesses are less likely from 2007-2011 than they 
were during the baseline year of 2005. As discussed previously, this trend could reflect a general improvement in the 
quality of internal control environments, weaker audits of internal controls, or both. 
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significantly less likely for clients with higher levels of institutional ownership. The area under 
the ROC curve for the prediction model is 0.913, suggesting that the model does an excellent job 
of separating material weakness clients from non-material weakness clients.  
  Table 4 presents our opinion shopping analysis. The analysis in Panel A is based on the 
full sample of 11,361 observations having an incumbent Big 4 auditor (i.e., a Big 4 auditor in the 
previous year).11 Of these 11,361 observations, 11,039 did not change their auditor, 197 changed 
to another Big 4 auditor, 90 changed to a mid-tier auditor, and 35 changed to a smaller auditor. 
Panel A includes all observations, Panel B removes changes to small auditors, and Panel C 
removes changes to small auditors and mid-tier auditors. The results presented in Panel A 
indicate that auditor dismissals are more likely for restatement clients (REST), small clients 
(SIZE), clients with greater bankruptcy risk (BANK_RISK), clients with greater accruals (ACCR), 
and clients where the incumbent auditor had longer tenure (TENURE). Auditor dismissals also 
tend to be more likely when audit market competition is higher across all three measures of audit 
market competition. These findings stand to reason, as clients should be more willing (and more 
able) to change auditors when substitutes are readily available in the local audit market. 
Research Question 1   
 The variable used to test our first research question is SHOP. As discussed previously, 
SHOP is based on the predicted values generated by the adverse internal control opinion model 
presented in Table 3. As SHOP becomes more negative (more positive), clients that are engaging 
in opinion shopping should be more likely (less likely) to dismiss their auditors. We initially 
define SHOP as SHOP(normal), where the differences between the predicted values from the 
adverse internal control opinion prediction model are transformed into probabilities. The 
                                                            
11 Because our COMP=DISTANCE_IND models exclude MSA industries without the presence of at least two 
auditors, total observations in the COMP=DISTANCE_IND tests presented in Tables 4 and 5 are 10,780, 10,747, 
and 10,660 with 301, 268, and 181 switches in Panels A, B, and C, respectively. 
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significant negative coefficient for SHOP(normal) in Panel A suggests that across all 
observations, clients would have received adverse internal control opinions more frequently if 
they had made different auditor retention or dismissal decisions. Like Lennox (2000), we also 
conduct tests that are based on the differences between the raw predicted values themselves. 
When we estimate the models presented in Panel A with SHOP defined as SHOP(raw), the 
coefficients are negative and significant as well. Thus, both specifications of SHOP suggest that 
audit clients do seem to be successful at shopping for internal control opinions.12 
The results presented in Panel A of Table 4 include all incumbent Big 4 auditors. In Panel 
B, we remove clients changing to small auditors to determine whether the results from Panel A 
are driven by these observations. Panel B shows that when changes to small auditors are 
removed, our results are unchanged. All coefficients for SHOP(normal) and SHOP(raw) remain 
negative and statistically significant, and all of the competition measures remain positive and 
statistically significant. In Panel C of Table A, we remove changes to both small and mid-tier 
auditors, such that these models are estimated only for clients that retain their incumbent Big 4 
auditor or engage a new Big 4 auditor. With these models, only the coefficients for SHOP(raw) 
remain negative and significant, indicating weaker evidence of internal control opinion shopping 
for this subset of clients. Furthermore, only one of the competition measures is statistically 
significant. 
There are two takeaways associated with Panels B and C of Table 4. First, although we 
do find evidence of opinion shopping among all subsamples with the SHOP(raw) measure, a 
conservative interpretation of the evidence would suggest that opinion shopping may be most 
likely among clients that do not prefer or require the services of Big 4 auditors. As such, this 
                                                            
12 When we add to our base sample the 1,806 firms having non-Big 4 auditors in year t-1, our results are 
qualitatively unchanged. For example, all three SHOP(normal) coefficients in Panel A of Table 4 are statistically 
significant, with z-statistics ranging from -2.468 to -2.915. 
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portion of our “what-if” analysis lends credence to the idea that opinion leniency may be more 
likely among non-Big 4 auditors (Ettredge et al. 2011). Second, the results suggest that audit 
market competition affects auditor dismissal decisions to a greater extent for clients that are able 
to switch to Big 4, mid-tier, or smaller auditors than for clients that may be limited to switching 
to another Big 4 auditor. Again, this finding is intuitively appealing given that auditor dismissals, 
regardless of motive, should be more likely when clients have a larger viable auditor pool from 
which to draw. 
Research Question 2 
 Table 5 addresses our second research question, regarding the relationship between 
internal control opinion shopping and audit market competition. In Panel A of Table 5, we 
classify observations into high versus low competition partitions based on median values of 
DISTANCE_MSA, DISTANCE_IND, and HERF. We then re-estimate the opinion shopping 
models from Table 4 separately for each partition, with the competition measures excluded. The 
resulting models evaluate the extent to which opinion shopping exists in markets that can be 
classified as having low competition or high competition.13 As in Table 4, we also estimate the 
models separately for the three potential auditor size categories to determine whether audit 
market competition affects the opinion shopping activities of these client groups differentially. 
The results presented in Panel A of Table 5 indicate that across the full sample, a 
relationship does exist between internal control opinion shopping and audit market competition. 
Specifically, SHOP(normal) is negative and significant for clients of all incumbent Big 4 
auditors across all three competition proxies when competition is high, and is not significant 
                                                            
13 We use this method because interpreting the results is more intuitive than interpreting an interaction term, and the 
estimation of separate models for two groups is a common method used in cross-sectional tests [e.g., Jayaraman and 
Milbourn (2015), Chen, Gul, Veeraghavan, and Zolotoy (2015), Kirk, Reppenhagen, and Tucker (2014), Beck and 
Mauldin (2014)].  
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when competition is low. SHOP(raw) is negative and significant in both low and high 
competition markets. When we remove clients changing from Big 4 auditors to small auditors, 
SHOP(normal) remains negative and significant in the high competition partition of all three 
proxies and, again, is not significant in any of the low competition partitions. In this 
specification, SHOP(raw) is also negative and significant in all three of the high competition 
partitions and remains significant in two of the low competition partitions. When we remove 
changes to small auditors and mid-tier auditors, SHOP(normal) is significant in two of the high 
competition partitions, SHOP(raw) is significant in all three high competition partitions, and 
neither measure is significant in any of the low competition partitions. Overall, the results 
presented in Panel A of Table 5 provide strong evidence that successful opinion shopping 
appears to be more prevalent in competitive audit markets.14  
In Panel B of Table 5 we present alternative tests of the relationship between opinion 
shopping and audit market competition. In these models, we include decile competition ranks as 
main effects and also interact the ranks with our opinion shopping variables. If internal control 
opinion shopping is related to audit market competition, the interaction terms should be 
negative.15 Panel B shows that when the sample includes all incumbent Big 4 auditors, there is 
strong evidence of a relationship between opinion shopping and audit market competition. 
Specifically, five of the six competition interactions are negative and significant. When the 
analysis is limited to Big 4 clients that retain their auditors, change to other Big 4 auditors, or 
change to mid-tier auditors (i.e., removing changes to small auditors), three of the six 
                                                            
14 As an additional sensitivity test, we use factor analysis to create a single competition factor that is based on all 
three competition measures. Using this factor produces inferences that are identical to those that are associated with 
the results presented in Tables 4 and 5.  
 
15 We use the procedure described in Norton, Wang, and Ai (2004) to estimate the interaction term coefficients and 
p-values. 
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competition interactions are negative and significant. In Panel B, however, there is little evidence 
of a relationship between opinion shopping and audit market competition among firms that either 
prefer or require the services of a Big 4 auditor. Although the results for this last group of firms 
differs from the results presented in Panel A, in general Table 5 provides compelling evidence 
that opinion shopping is facilitated by audit market competition.  
Research Question 3 
 Table 6 addresses our third research question, regarding the relationship between opinion 
shopping and the timing of auditor dismissals. Recall that within our “what-if” framework, 
opinion shopping may exist regardless of whether or not the incumbent auditor is actually 
dismissed. However, for dismissals that do occur, our expectation is that those that are motivated 
by opinion shopping will tend to occur later in the reporting period than those that are not 
motivated by opinion shopping. In Table 6, we replicate the analysis from Table 4 with the 
dependent variable (DISMISS) defining, alternatively, the 237 early dismissal clients and the 85 
late dismissal clients. All non-dismissal firm-years are included as control observations. Table 6 
shows that there is a relationship between opinion shopping and the timing of auditor dismissals 
across all competition measures and all audit firm size partitions. With the SHOP(normal) 
specification, we find evidence consistent with opinion shopping in all nine of the late dismissal 
models and in none of the early dismissal models. With the SHOP(raw) specification, we find 
evidence consistent with opinion shopping in all nine of the late dismissal models and in six of 
the early dismissal models. Additionally, using seemingly unrelated estimation, the 
SHOP(normal) and SHOP(raw) coefficients in the late dismissal models are significantly larger 
than the coefficients in the early dismissal models in 14 of the 18 models.16  
                                                            
16 We also find that among dismissal firms, opinion shopping may be related to auditor quality. For example, 54 
percent of the late switchers in our sample change to mid-tier or smaller auditors compared to only 33 percent of 
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 We also re-estimate our Table 5, Panel A models for both early and late dismissal 
observations. We do not present a separate table because this process results in the creation of 72 
additional models.17 Across these 72 models, there are 18 models in each dismissal timing / audit 
market competition pairing. For the 36 early dismissal models, the SHOP(normal) and 
SHOP(raw) coefficients are negative and significant in only three of the 18 low competition 
models and in only nine of the 18 high competition models. In contrast, for the 36 late dismissal 
models, the SHOP(normal) and SHOP(raw) coefficients are negative and significant in 11 of the 
18 low competition models and in 16 of the 18 high competition models.18 Overall, the evidence 
regarding our third research question suggests that auditor dismissals that occur relatively late in 
the reporting period are much more likely to be associated with opinion shopping than auditor 
dismissals that occur early in the reporting period, particularly when audit markets are 
competitive. 
Additional Tests 
Going Concern Opinions 
 To test whether our internal control opinion shopping results are attributable to clients 
that might also be shopping for favorable GC opinions, we take two approaches. First, we 
remove the 91 observations where clients have a GC opinion in year t-1. With these observations 
removed, our results are qualitatively and statistically unchanged. Second, we construct a GC 
                                                                                                                                                                                               
early switchers. To the extent that late dismissals are more likely to be associated with opinion shopping activities, a 
relationship between opinion shopping and auditor quality appears to exist in dismissal situations.  
17 The 72 models are the product of the following combinations: three potential auditor samples * two SHOP 
specifications * three COMP specifications * two competition categories (high versus low) within each COMP 
specification * two dismissal timing specifications (early versus late). 
 
18 Late dismissals also occur relatively more frequently than early dismissals in high competition markets – markets 
that we show in Table 5 to be associated with a greater incidence of opinion-shopping activities. For example, 81 
percent of late dismissals are in high DISTANCE_IND markets, as compared to only 67 percent of early dismissals. 
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opinion shopping variable relating to going concern modifications (GCSHOP) using the same 
procedure we used to construct the internal control opinion shopping variable (SHOP).19 We then 
include both of these variables in our auditor dismissal models.20 Table 7 replicates the analysis 
we present in Table 4 and shows that when we allow for both types of opinion shopping, there is 
no evidence of GC opinion shopping (i.e., avoiding going concern explanatory language) and our 
internal control opinion shopping results are generally unchanged from the original Table 4 
results.21 Specifically, SHOP(normal) and SHOP(raw) are consistently negative and significant 
in Panels A and B of Table 7 and SHOP(raw) is negative and significant in one model in Panel C 
of Table 7. Furthermore, the GC opinion shopping variable is not statistically significant in any 
of the models. Overall, the findings presented in Table 7 are consistent with our expectation that 
internal control opinions are less predictable – and, hence, potentially more valuable – than GC 
opinions.  
In untabulated results, we do find evidence of audit opinion shopping during the pre-SOX 
era. This result – which is consistent with Carcello and Neal (2003) and Lennox (2002) – 
combined with the insignificance of GCSHOP in Table 7 suggests that firms are less likely to try 
to avoid going concern opinions after SOX than they were before SOX. One possible 
explanation for the difference in results across these two periods is that the introduction and 
importance of internal control opinions in the post-SOX era has reduced the importance of the 
                                                            
19 Our going concern opinion prediction model is based on previous research and includes controls for bankruptcy 
risk, loss, client size, client age, leverage, change in leverage, operating cash flows, announcement lag, investments, 
new financing, Big 4 auditor, stock return, stock volatility, institutional ownership, prior going concern, auditor 
dismissal, and year and industry fixed effects.  
 
20 Because our COMP=DISTANCE_IND models exclude MSA industries without the presence of at least two 
auditors, total observations in the COMP=DISTANCE_IND tests in Table 7 are 10,564, 10,533, and 10,542 with 
289, 258, and 177 switches in Panels A, B, and C, respectively. 
 
21 When we omit SHOP from the Table 7 models, GCSHOP remains insignificant. 
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GC opinion in the portfolio of factors firms consider as they are evaluating whether to retain or 
dismiss their auditors. This explanation is corroborated by the fact that the PCAOB and other 
regulatory agencies have expressed serious concern regarding deficiencies related to internal 
control opinions and auditors’ testing of internal controls, but rarely discuss issues related to 
going concern assessments. 
Auditor Dismissal versus Auditor Retention 
 The benefit of the “what-if” approach is that it permits modeling of opinion shopping that 
may be associated with decisions to retain auditors as well as decisions to dismiss auditors. To 
investigate whether opinion shopping seems to exist across both types of decisions, we estimate 
separate models for clients that were predicted to have a potential benefit from dismissing their 
auditors (i.e., SHOP is negative) and clients that were predicted to have a potential benefit from 
retaining their auditors (i.e., SHOP is positive). In these models, the opinion shopping coefficient 
is consistently negative and significant for negative SHOP clients. That is, we find evidence of 
significant opinion shopping for audit clients that were predicted to benefit from dismissing their 
auditors across all sample cuts – even among the subsample of clients that retain their Big 4 
auditor or change to another Big 4 auditor. Additional analysis reveals that the results for 
negative SHOP clients are primarily attributable to opinion shopping in high competition 
markets, consistent with our second research question.  
We also find significant evidence of opinion shopping among positive SHOP clients, on 
average, using the SHOP(raw) measure but not with the SHOP(normal) measure. When we 
estimate separate models based on high versus low competition, however, the coefficients for 
both SHOP(normal) and SHOP(raw) are negative and significant for positive SHOP clients in all 
three high competition models for the full sample and in all three high competition models when 
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changes to small auditors are removed. Overall, these tests provide compelling evidence (1) that 
opinion shopping activity exists among clients that are predicted to benefit from dismissing their 
auditors as well as clients that are predicted to benefit from retaining their auditors; and (2) that 
competition facilitates opinion shopping for both groups of clients. 
Opinion Shopping in Restatement Firms 
 Rice and Weber (2012) find that companies often fail to disclose a material weakness at 
the time that a misstatement exists but subsequently disclose a material weakness when a 
restatement is announced. We conduct a separate analysis for the restatement companies in our 
sample to determine whether opinion shopping might explain these “missing” adverse internal 
control opinions. Our sample of 11,361 observations includes 1,124 misstated firm-years in 
which material weaknesses are not disclosed. When we estimate our baseline model for this 
subset of firm-years, the coefficients for SHOP(normal) and SHOP(raw) are significant at 
p<0.02 and p<0.01, respectively. These findings are consistent with the notion that the non-
disclosure of material weaknesses during the year(s) of misstatement may be partially facilitated 
by opinion shopping activities.  
Changes in Opinion Shopping Over Time 
 As discussed previously, regulators have expressed concern about the number of material 
weaknesses that have been reported in recent years. The downward trend could be attributable to 
more successful client remediation efforts, greater numbers of audit deficiencies, and/or an 
increase in internal control opinion shopping activities. To determine whether decreases in 
reported material weaknesses might be related to increases in opinion shopping, we estimate 
separate models for different time periods (e.g., 2005-2007 versus 2008-2011). The SHOP 
coefficients in these models are significant (p<0.01) in both early and late post-SOX periods, and 
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the coefficients are not statistically different from each other. The consistency of the relationship 
across these periods leads us to conclude that the decrease in reported material weaknesses is not 
attributable to an increase in opinion shopping.  
All Auditor Changes 
We also conduct our analysis with the auditor change definition broadened to include 
both auditor dismissals and auditor resignations. While this specification provides a noisier 
proxy for potential opinion shopping activities, our results are not materially affected by 
broadening the measure. All of the results associated with our first and second research questions 
are statistically and qualitatively unchanged when we add resignations to the sample. The results 
associated with our third research question are slightly sensitive to the inclusion of resignations, 
but not in a predictable manner. For example, SHOP(normal) is significant in all nine late 
dismissal models with resignations excluded but is significant in only six of the nine late 
dismissal models with resignations included. However, SHOP(raw) is significant in six of the 
nine early dismissal models with resignations excluded but is significant in all nine early 
dismissal models with resignations included. Overall, when we include both resignations and 
dismissals the inferences that we draw with respect to all three research questions are unchanged. 
VI. CONCLUSIONS 
 For any audit client, a clean internal control opinion could be indicative of acceptable 
internal controls, audit deficiencies, and/or internal control opinion shopping activities. Our 
purpose in this paper is to investigate the latter factor, thereby addressing potential compromises 
in auditor independence and audit quality that traditionally have been associated with the notion 
of audit opinion shopping. Using the framework of Lennox (2000), we find that audit clients 
appear to be successful at shopping for clean internal control opinions. More specifically, our 
results suggest that clients would have received adverse internal control opinions more 
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frequently if they had made different auditor retention or dismissal decisions. We also find that 
internal control opinion shopping is more likely to occur in audit markets that can be classified as 
having relatively high levels of competition. Finally, we find that among clients that dismiss their 
auditors, opinion shopping activities tend to be more likely when the auditor is dismissed late in 
the reporting period and when the audit market is highly competitive.  
 Our results have a number of important implications for the profession. First, our finding 
that successful internal control opinion shopping appears to exist may prove useful to the 
PCAOB as it evaluates its assessments of audit deficiencies. Of particular relevance is our 
evidence that significant opinion shopping activity appears to exist among firms that have clean 
internal control opinions in advance of financial statement restatements. Our results also 
corroborate recent academic research indicating that material weakness disclosures cannot 
reliably be used as advance warning systems for financial reporting problems (e.g., Rice and 
Weber 2012, Scholz 2014) and that the costs of disclosing material weaknesses seem to 
outweigh the corresponding benefits (e.g., Rice et al. 2014, Hogan et al. 2014). That is, given 
that material weakness disclosures are costly and that it may be difficult for external users to 
predict them (unlike going concern opinions), audit clients have an incentive to attempt to 
manage the audit process to maximize the probability of receiving a clean internal control 
opinion. Finally, our finding that auditor dismissals that occur relatively late in the reporting 
period are more likely to be associated with successful opinion shopping may prove useful to 
regulatory agencies as they continue addressing issues related to auditor independence, the 
potential negative antecedents for auditor changes, and the impact of audit market competition 
on audit quality. 
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APPENDIX A 
 
Variable Definitions 
 
 
Panel A: 
Internal Control Opinion, Opinion Shopping, Auditor Dismissal, and Competition Variables 
 
Variable Definition 
MWt Indicator variable equal to 1 if the client’s auditor reported a Section 404 
material weakness in year t. 
MWt-1 Indicator variable equal to 1 if the client’s auditor reported a Section 404 
material weakness in year t-1. 
DISMISSt Indicator variable equal to 1 if the client dismissed its auditor in year t. 
SHOP(raw) Using the coefficients from model 1 (MW model), the predicted value 
when DISMISS is set to one less the predicted value when DISMISS is 
set to zero. 
SHOP(normal) The probability of a MW based on the predicted value from model 1 
(MW model) when DISMISS is set to one less the probability of a MW 
based on the predicted value when DISMISS is set to zero. 
DISTANCE Within an audit market, the distance in audit fee share between the 
incumbent auditor and the auditor with the next closest audit fee share 
(see Numan and Willekens 2012). An audit market is defined as either 
the MSA (DISTANCE_MSA) or the MSA-industry based on Fama & 
French 12 definitions (DISTANCE_IND). Regressions use a decile 
ranking in reverse order such that higher values represent a closer 
substitute auditor.  
HERF The sum of the squared audit fee market shares of all auditors in the 
MSA. Regressions use a decile ranking in reverse order such that higher 
values represent greater competition (lower concentration). 
 
Panel B: 
General Control Variables 
 
Variable Definition 
REST Indicator variable equal to 1 if the client announced a restatement of 
prior-year financial statements in the period from the prior-year 10-K 
filing to the current-year 10-K filing.  
SIZE Log of total assets. 
LOSS Indicator variable equal to 1 if income before extraordinary items is 
negative. 
BANK_RISK Decile ranking of bankruptcy risk as defined in Shumway (2001). 
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APPENDIX A (continued) 
 
Variable Definitions 
 
ROOT_SEGS Square root of the number of business and geographic segments. 
FOREIGN_SALES Indicator variable equal to 1 if the company has any foreign sales. 
AGE Log of 1+ the number of years since the company was first listed in 
Compustat. 
GROWTH Percentage change in sales from year t-1 to year t. 
RESTRUCT Indicator variable equal to 1 if the company has any restructuring 
charges. 
ACQUISITION Cash flows for acquisitions scaled by average total assets. 
BIG4 Indicator variable equal to 1 if the auditor in year t is a Big 4 firm. 
LEVERAGE Long-term debt divided by total assets. 
ROA Net income divided by average total assets. 
CASH Cash and cash equivalents scaled by lagged total assets. 
ACCR Net income less operating cash flows net of cash flows for discontinued 
operations scaled by lagged total assets.   
INVREC Inventory plus receivables divided by total assets. 
GC Indicator variable equal to 1 if the company received a going concern 
opinion in year t-1. 
TENURE Number of continuous years of the auditor-client relationship as of the 
beginning of the year with a maximum value of 10 years. 
MISMATCH A measure of mismatch of the auditor and client at year t-1 following 
Shu (2000). 
IND_PORT 
 
An audit office’s percentage share of the audit fees at the industry-MSA 
level at year t-1, where industry is based on the Fama & French 12 
definitions. 
INST_OWNERSHIP The percentage of the company’s shares owned by institutional owners. 
MGMT_CHANGE Indicator variable equal to 1 if the company hired a new CEO or CFO in 
year t-1 or year t. 
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TABLE 1 
Descriptive Statistics 
 
 
Panel A: 
Internal Control Opinion, Opinion Shopping, Auditor Dismissal, and Competition Variables 
 
Variable Mean Median 25% 75% 
MWt 0.042 0.000 0.000 0.000
MWt-1 0.054 0.000 0.000 0.000
DISMISS 0.028 0.000 0.000 0.000
SHOP (raw) -0.001 0.249 -0.326 0.786 
SHOP (normal) 0.025 0.008 -0.003 0.041
DISTANCE_MSA -0.080 -0.044 -0.098 -0.017
DISTANCE_IND -0.186 -0.088 -0.250 -0.031
HERF  -0.277 -0.255 -0.300 -0.228
 
Panel B: 
General Control Variables 
 
  
Variable Mean Median 25% 75% 
REST 0.071 0.000 0.000 0.000 
SIZE 7.126 7.013 5.959 8.153 
LOSS 0.244 0.000 0.000 0.000 
BANK_RISK 4.388 4.000 2.000 7.000 
ROOT_SEGS 2.236 2.236 1.732 2.646 
FOREIGN_SALES 0.124 0.000 0.000 0.000 
AGE 2.942 2.833 2.485 3.526 
GROWTH 0.111 0.077 -0.018 0.190 
RESTRUCT 0.335 0.000 0.000 1.000 
ACQUISITION 0.029 0.000 0.000 0.019 
BIG4 0.989 1.000 1.000 1.000 
LEVERAGE 0.203 0.158 0.005 0.315 
ROA 0.020 0.041 0.002 0.082 
CASH 0.201 0.113 0.035 0.284 
ACCR 0.081 0.057 0.030 0.104 
INVREC 0.231 0.199 0.088 0.328 
GC 0.008 0.000 0.000 0.000 
TENURE 7.627 9.000 5.000 10.000 
MISMATCH 0.071 0.000 0.000 0.000 
IND_PORT 0.246 0.154 0.070 0.350 
INST_OWNERSHIP 0.667 0.770 0.503 0.909 
MGMT_CHANGE 0.433 0.000 0.000 1.000 
 
All variables are defined in Appendix A. The competition variables  (DISTANCE_MSA, DISTANCE_IND, and 
HERF) are the raw values multiplied by negative one, such that higher values represent greater competition. The 
sample size is 11,846 for the adverse opinion selection model variables (MW, MWt-1, DISMISS, REST, SIZE, LOSS, 
BANK_RISK, ROOT_SEGS, FOREIGN_SALES, AGE, GROWTH, RESTRUCT, ACQUISITION, and BIG4). The 
sample size is 10,780 for DIST_IND and 11,361 for all other variables. Continuous variables are winsorized at the 1st 
and 99th percentiles. 
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TABLE 2 
Selected Pearson Correlations 
 
Variable (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) 
(1) MWt     
(2) MWt-1 0.30     
(3) DISMISS 0.06 0.11     
(4) SHOP (raw) -0.04 -0.11 -0.01     
(5) SHOP (normal) -0.12 -0.31 -0.02 0.48     
(6) DISTANCE_MSA 0.01 0.03 0.09 -0.01 -0.01     
(7) DISTANCE_IND 0.01 0.03 0.09 0.04 0.02 0.24     
(8) HERF -0.02 -0.01 0.04 -0.01 0.02 0.47 0.20     
(9) REST 0.33 0.08 0.04 -0.06 -0.10 0.02 0.01 0.01      
(10) LOSS 0.11 0.11 0.04 0.13 0.24 0.05 0.06 0.03 0.06     
(11) BANK_RISK 0.09 0.11 0.06 0.07 0.17 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.06 0.38    
(12) ROOT_SEGS 0.01 0.02 -0.02 -0.04 -0.03 -0.04 -0.05 -0.06 0.00 -0.11 -0.19   
(13) INST_OWNERSHIP -0.07 -0.07 -0.04 -0.05 -0.27 -0.02 -0.03 -0.05 -0.01 -0.20 -0.21 0.05  
(14) MGMT_CHANGE 0.06 0.10 0.01 -0.17 -0.21 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.03 0.12 0.08 0.02 -0.06 
 
All variables are defined in Appendix A. Bolded correlations are significant at the 5 percent level.
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TABLE 3 
Adverse Internal Control Opinion Prediction Model 
MWt = γ0 + γ1MWt-1+ γ2DISMISSt + γ3DISMISSt*MWt-1 + γ4Xt + γ5DISMISSt*Xt + ε 
 
 
Variable 
 
Coefficient 
 
z-stat 
MWt-1 1.193 15.121** 
DISMISS -3.666 -3.428** 
DISMISS*MWt-1 -0.603 -2.383** 
   
X Vector of Control Variables   
REST 1.432 22.496** 
SIZE -0.059 -2.539** 
LOSS 0.333 5.196** 
BANK_RISK 0.026 2.287** 
ROOT_SEGS 0.129 2.500** 
FOREIGN_SALES 0.115 1.461 
AGE -0.053 -1.173 
GROWTH 0.019 0.231 
RESTRUCT 0.003 0.040 
ACQUISITION 0.511 1.651* 
BIG4 0.004 0.018 
INST_OWNERSHIP -0.194 -2.383** 
MGMT_CHANGE 0.088 1.702* 
   
Interactions   
DISMISS*REST -0.329 -1.241 
DISMISS*SIZE 0.004 0.047 
DISMISS*LOSS 0.163 0.614 
DISMISS*BANK_RISK 0.016 0.354 
DISMISS*ROOT_SEGS -0.115 -0.498 
DISMISS*FOREIGN_SALES 0.153 0.502 
DISMISS*AGE 0.064 0.361 
DISMISS*GROWTH -0.436 -1.439 
DISMISS*RESTRUCT 0.337 1.352 
DISMISS*ACQUISITION 1.849 1.354 
DISMISS*INST_OWNERSHIP -0.460 -1.471 
DISMISS*MGMT_CHANGE -0.459 -2.003** 
   
   
Year Indicators and their interaction 
terms with DISMISS 
Yes  
Fama-French 12 Industry Indicators 
and their interaction terms with 
DISMISS 
Yes  
   
Observations 11,846  
Pseudo R Squared 0.349  
   
 
**, * indicate significance at p<0.05 and p<0.10, respectively (two-tailed). 
All variables are defined in Appendix A.
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TABLE 4 
Auditor Dismissal Model 
DISMISSt = β0 + β1SHOPt + β2COMPt + β3Zt + ε 
 
Panel A: All Incumbent Big 4 Auditors (N=11,361 with 322 switches) 
 
 COMP = 
DISTANCE_MSA 
COMP = 
DISTANCE_IND 
COMP = 
HERF 
Variable Coeff z-stat Coeff z-stat Coeff z-stat 
SHOP (normal) -0.982 -2.730** -1.025 -2.817** -1.046 -2.975** 
COMP 0.074 7.478** 0.079 7.538** 0.034 3.571** 
REST 0.195 2.180** 0.209 2.209** 0.187 2.098** 
SIZE -0.111 -4.688** -0.119 -4.799** -0.122 -5.179** 
LEVERAGE 0.003 0.022 0.060 0.421 0.009 0.069 
ROA 0.212 0.914 0.132 0.544 0.195 0.837 
LOSS 0.040 0.487 0.022 0.259 0.050 0.614 
BANK_RISK 0.035 3.049** 0.034 2.814** 0.035 3.064** 
CASH -0.093 -0.667 -0.027 -0.189 -0.065 -0.480 
GROWTH 0.019 0.224 0.026 0.293 0.025 0.292 
ACCR 0.572 1.812* 0.501 1.532 0.565 1.806* 
INVREC 0.081 0.521 0.188 1.138 0.121 0.771 
ACQUISITION -0.214 -0.467 -0.110 -0.232 -0.190 -0.419 
GC 0.080 0.333 0.044 0.174 0.003 0.011 
TENURE 0.030 3.246** 0.031 3.335** 0.030 3.341** 
MISMATCH 0.025 0.252 0.014 0.136 0.026 0.262 
IND_PORT -0.115 -0.958 0.026 0.206 -0.030 -0.244 
INST_OWNERSHIP -0.118 -1.367 -0.125 -1.372 -0.125 -1.463 
MGMT_CHANGE -0.030 -0.546 -0.041 -0.723 -0.035 -0.632 
       
Year Indicators Yes  Yes  Yes  
Fama-French Industry Indicators Yes  Yes  Yes  
       
       
SHOP (raw) -0.545 -4.610** -0.557 -4.513** -0.577 -4.871** 
COMP 0.073 7.374** 0.079 7.562** 0.034 3.556** 
       
Panel B: Remove Changes to Small Auditors (N=11,326 with 287 switches)   
       
 COMP = 
DISTANCE_MSA 
COMP = 
DISTANCE_IND 
COMP = 
HERF 
Variable Coeff z-stat Coeff z-stat Coeff z-stat 
SHOP (normal) -0.741 -1.997** -0.728 -1.95* -0.784 -2.154** 
COMP  0.058 5.817** 0.066 6.301** 0.027 2.797** 
       
SHOP (raw) -0.467 -3.800** -0.471 -3.687** -0.486 -3.952** 
COMP  0.057 5.731** 0.066 6.315** 0.027 2.746** 
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TABLE 4 (continued) 
 
**, * indicate significance at p<0.05 and p<0.10, respectively (two-tailed). 
All variables are defined in Appendix A. 
  
 
Panel C: Remove Changes to Small and Mid-Tier Auditors (N=11,236 with 197 switches) 
 
       
 COMP = 
DISTANCE_MSA 
COMP = 
DISTANCE_IND 
COMP = 
HERF 
Variable Coeff z-stat Coeff z-stat Coeff z-stat 
SHOP (normal) -0.417 -1.030 -0.367 -0.891 -0.418 -1.029 
COMP  -0.001 -0.013 0.025 2.258** 0.006 0.604 
       
SHOP (raw) -0.375 -2.591** -0.328 -2.185** -0.374 -2.586** 
COMP  
 
-0.001 -0.075 0.025 2.260** 0.006 0.584 
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TABLE 5 
Opinion Shopping and Audit Market Competition 
 
 
 
  
 
Panel A: Separate Models for low versus 
high competition markets 
 
 
 
All Incumbent Big 
4 Auditors 
 
N=11,361 with 
322 switches 
 
 
Remove Changes 
to Small Auditors 
 
N=11,326 with 
287 switches 
 
Remove Changes 
to Small and Mid-
Tier Auditors 
 
N=11,236 with 
197 switches 
 
SHOP(normal)  
 
 
SHOP 
Coeff 
 
SHOP 
z-stat 
 
SHOP 
Coeff 
 
SHOP 
z-stat 
 
SHOP 
Coeff 
 
SHOP 
z-stat 
Low DISTANCE_MSA 0.045 0.072 0.066 0.106 -0.024 -0.039 
High DISTANCE_MSA -1.692 -3.735** -1.380 -2.945** -0.947 -1.767* 
       
Low DISTANCE_IND 0.358 0.579 0.793 1.226 0.630 0.966 
High DISTANCE_IND -1.879 -3.846** -1.629 -3.221** -1.206 -1.999** 
       
Low HERF -0.182 -0.334 0.072 0.128 0.063 0.104 
High HERF -1.759 -3.745** -1.510 -3.076** -0.863 -1.590 
 
SHOP(raw) 
 
SHOP 
Coeff 
 
SHOP 
z-stat 
 
SHOP 
Coeff 
 
SHOP 
z-stat 
 
SHOP 
Coeff 
 
SHOP 
z-stat 
Low DISTANCE_MSA -0.357 -1.892* -0.324 -1.700* -0.305 -1.571 
High DISTANCE_MSA -0.686 -4.538** -0.588 -3.669** -0.469 -2.262** 
       
Low DISTANCE_IND -0.469 -2.120** -0.374 -1.633 -0.374 -1.601 
High DISTANCE_IND -0.651 -4.369** -0.564 -3.640** -0.383 -1.904* 
       
Low HERF -0.466 -2.539** -0.324 -1.694* -0.319 -1.517 
High HERF -0.721 -4.655** -0.668 -4.107** -0.419 -2.153** 
 
 
 
 
 
Panel B: Interaction Models 
 
 
 
All Incumbent Big 
4 Auditors 
 
N=11,361 with 
322 switches 
 
 
Remove Changes 
to Small Auditors 
 
N=11,326 with 
287 switches 
 
Remove Changes 
to Small and Mid-
Tier Auditors 
 
N=11,236 with 
197 switches 
 
SHOP(normal) interactions 
 
 
 
Coeff 
 
 
z-stat 
 
 
Coeff 
 
 
z-stat 
 
 
Coeff 
 
 
z-stat 
SHOP(normal)*Decile_DISTANCE_MSA -0.012 -1.761* -0.006 -1.123 -0.001 -0.062 
SHOP(normal)*Decile_DISTANCE_IND -0.019 -2.233** -0.016 -2.000** -0.008 -1.519 
SHOP(normal)*Decile_HERF -0.012 -1.843* -0.009 -1.451 -0.004 -0.823 
       
SHOP(raw)*Decile_DISTANCE_MSA -0.004 -2.570** -0.002 -1.990** 0.001 0.433 
SHOP(raw)*Decile_DISTANCE_IND -0.005 -2.823** -0.003 -2.499** -0.001 -1.487 
SHOP(raw)*Decile_HERF -0.001 -1.544 -0.001 -1.100 -0.001 -0.092 
 
**, * indicate significance at p<0.05 and p<0.10, respectively (two-tailed). Low and High competition partitions are 
based on below- and above-median cuts for the three competition proxies. All variables are defined in Appendix A.
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TABLE 6 
Opinion Shopping and Timing of Auditor Dismissals 
 
  
 
All Incumbent Big 4 
Auditors 
 
N=11,361 with 
237 early / 85 late 
switches 
 
 
Remove Changes to 
Small Auditors 
 
N=11,326 with 
214 early / 73 late 
switches 
 
Remove Changes to 
Small and Mid-Tier 
Auditors 
 
N=11,236 with 
158 early / 39 late 
switches 
COMP=DISTANCE_MSA 
 
Timing of Dismissal 
 
SHOP 
Coeff 
 
SHOP 
z-stat 
 
SHOP 
Coeff 
 
SHOP 
z-stat 
 
SHOP 
Coeff 
 
SHOP 
z-stat 
Early – SHOP(normal) -0.421 -1.016 -0.238 -0.561 -0.111 -0.243 
Late  – SHOP (normal) -2.311 -4.012** -1.934 -3.338** -1.413 -1.986** 
       
Early – SHOP(raw) -0.312 -2.348** -0.258 -1.890* -0.186 -1.210 
Late – SHOP(raw) -1.017 -5.147** -0.868 -4.237** -0.856 -3.075** 
       
 
COMP=DISTANCE_IND 
 
Timing of Dismissal 
 
 
SHOP 
Coeff 
 
 
SHOP 
z-stat 
 
 
SHOP 
Coeff 
 
 
SHOP 
z-stat 
 
 
SHOP 
Coeff 
 
 
SHOP 
z-stat 
Early – SHOP(normal) -0.406 -0.988 -0.162 -0.385 -0.042 -0.092 
Late  – SHOP (normal) -2.318 -3.887** -1.950 -3.307** -1.385 -1.931* 
       
Early – SHOP(raw) -0.312 -2.274** -0.244 -1.742* -0.146 -0.918 
Late – SHOP(raw) -1.039 -4.964** -0.895 -4.141** -0.774 -2.631** 
       
 
COMP=HERF 
 
Timing of Dismissal 
 
 
SHOP 
Coeff
 
 
SHOP 
z-stat
 
 
SHOP 
Coeff
 
 
SHOP 
z-stat 
 
 
SHOP 
Coeff
 
 
SHOP 
z-stat
Early – SHOP(normal) -0.466 -1.155 -0.271 -0.650 -0.114 -0.248 
Late  – SHOP (normal) -2.282 -4.038** -1.908 -3.375** -1.411 -1.981** 
       
Early – SHOP(raw) -0.333 -2.500** -0.269 -1.965** -0.187 -1.214 
Late – SHOP(raw) -1.041 -5.363** -0.889 -4.396** -0.853 -3.061** 
       
 
Early (late) dismissals are defined as those that occur within or preceding (after) the first two quarters of the fiscal 
year. All variables are defined in Appendix A. 
 
Shaded cells indicate that the early and late SHOP coefficients within the same column are significantly different 
from each other (p<0.05) based on seemingly unrelated estimation. 
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TABLE 7 
Internal Control Opinion Shopping and Going Concern Opinion Shopping 
DISMISSt = β0 + β1SHOPt + β2GCSHOPt + β3COMPt + β3Zt + ε 
 
Panel A: All Incumbent Big 4 Auditors (N=11,132 with 310 switches) 
 
 COMP = 
DISTANCE_MSA 
COMP = 
DISTANCE_IND 
COMP = 
HERF 
Variable Coeff z-stat Coeff z-stat Coeff z-stat 
SHOP (normal) -0.902 -2.430** -0.929 -2.485** -0.957 -2.641** 
GCSHOP (normal) -0.801 -1.186 -0.726 -0.991 -0.637 -0.937 
COMP 0.070 6.967** 0.076 7.169** 0.032 3.307** 
       
SHOP (raw) -0.537 -4.392** -0.541 -4.245** -0.562 -4.596** 
GCSHOP (raw) -0.129 -0.581 -0.111 -0.470 -0.067 -0.306 
COMP 0.069 6.886** 0.077 7.190** 0.032 3.296** 
       
 
Panel B: Remove Changes to Small Auditors (N=11,099 with 277 switches) 
 
 
 COMP = 
DISTANCE_MSA 
COMP = 
DISTANCE_IND 
COMP = 
HERF 
Variable Coeff z-stat Coeff z-stat Coeff z-stat
SHOP (normal) -0.705 -1.843* -0.683 -1.776* -0.741 -1.974** 
GCSHOP (normal) -0.463 -0.596 -0.403 -0.490 -0.300 -0.385 
COMP 0.054 5.345** 0.063 5.988** 0.026 2.632** 
       
SHOP (raw) -0.480 -3.788** -0.478 -3.634** -0.494 -3.898** 
GCSHOP (raw) -0.032 -0.127 -0.017 -0.062 0.028 0.112 
COMP 0.053 5.267** 0.064 5.991** 0.026 2.580** 
       
 
Panel C: Remove Changes to Small and Mid-Tier Auditors (N=11,015 with 193 switches) 
 
 COMP = 
DISTANCE_MSA
COMP = 
DISTANCE_IND 
COMP = 
HERF
Variable Coeff z-stat Coeff z-stat Coeff z-stat 
SHOP (normal) -0.467 -1.125 -0.423 -0.996 -0.465 -1.116 
GCSHOP (normal) -0.762 -0.910 -0.903 -1.078 -0.757 -0.911 
COMP -0.003 -0.248 0.023 1.999** 0.005 0.491 
       
SHOP (raw) -0.407 -2.772** -0.361 -2.364 -0.405 -2.761 
GCSHOP (raw) -0.177 -0.712 -0.232 -0.917 -0.177 -0.714 
COMP -0.003 -0.303 0.023 2.011** 0.005 0.466 
       
 
**, * indicate significance at p<0.05 and p<0.10, respectively (two-tailed). All variables except GCSHOP are 
defined in Appendix A. The vector of control variables represented by Z in this table is the same as in Table 4, 
except that GCSHOP replaces GC. GCSHOP is calculated in the same manner as SHOP, with a prediction model 
that includes controls for bankruptcy risk, loss, client size, client age, leverage, change in leverage, operating cash 
flows, announcement lag, investments, new financing, Big 4 auditor, stock return, stock volatility, institutional 
ownership, prior going concern, auditor dismissal, and year and industry fixed effects. 
